in command of the German Army, for saying that the situation at the end of the first day was extremely critical " and might have had serious consequences if the enemy had pushed further forward.[33] His further comments on the victory won by the British forces on 9th April are, worth quoting by way of showing how near we were to achieving a result which, if not decisive, would at least have involved a rolling up of the German Army to a line far behind that which they held on the morning of the battle,

Ludendorff's account of our failure to exploit success

" The Battle of Arras on 9th April was a bad beginning for the decisive struggle of this year.

10th April and the following days were critical.

The consequences of a break-through of 12 to 15 kilometres wide and 6 or more kilometres deep are not easy to meet. In view of the heavy losses in men, guns and ammunition resulting from such a break-through, colossal efforts are needed to make good the damage. It was the business of G.H.Q. to provide reserves on a large scale. But it was absolutely impossible, with the troops at our disposal and in view of the military situation, to have a second division immediately behind every division that might possibly fall out. A day like 9th April threw all calculations to the winds. Many days had to pass before a new line could really be formed and consolidated. The end of the crisis, even if the

troops were available, depended very largelyy-as it generally does in such cases, on whether the enemy, after his first victory would attack again, and by further success aggravate the difficulty of forming a new line. Our position having been weakened, such victories were to b§ won only too easily. The